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This paper traces the usurpation of Nikephoros Bryennios the elder, 1077/8 AD, by examining narratives 
from three Byzantine historians: Michael Attaleiates, John Skylitzes, and Nikephoros Bryennios the 
younger. For the most part, modern scholars have focussed on investigating successful usurpation 
candidates who managed to rise to imperial power. For this period, this included Nikephoros Botaneiates 
and Alexios Komnenos. Key questions are often asked, such as how usurpers managed to succeed and why 
did they choose to undertake a course of usurpation, often resulting in a narrative of justification and 
legitimacy.1 For this period, albeit from Neville (2012) on Nikephoros Bryennios, appreciation has not 
been given to usurpers who failed.2 This paper will provide a chronology of Nikephoros Bryennios’ 
usurpation, and how these three authors depict the incident, the correlations and differences between them, 
and lastly, preliminary thoughts why Bryennios’ usurpation failed compared to his successful 
contemporaries.   
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Introduction: Usurping the Throne in Byzantium  
The Byzantine Empire had a long-lasting issue with political instability, and a climax was 
reached in the mid-late eleventh century. Jean-Claude Cheynet’s study testifies to the serious 
problem and has identified two hundred and twenty-three conspiracies against the throne 
between AD 963-1210.3 Over one hundred of these conspiracies took place in the eleventh 
century alone. Opposition was an important aspect of autocratic rule regardless of an 
individual’s aptitude for success. For imperial rule, opposition often took the form of direct 
usurpation, riots instigated by the racing parties, and military rebellion or mutiny in the 
provinces.4 These types of opposition left the emperor’s position untenable and unstable. 
Depending on the character and attributes of the emperor, different types of insurrection took 
                                               
1 These questions are instrumental to answer in the field of usurpation because justification and legitimacy are the quintessential 
ingredients for understanding how individuals are successful or less fortunate in their coup attempts. The factors of justification 
and legitimacy intertwine with one another and are important when examining the perception of the usurper and how they 
were viewed by the public, state, and church during and after their usurpation.  
2 For a recent, although currently unpublished, thesis that addresses some of the limitations of previous studies on usurpation 
during this period, see Davidson, The Glory of Ruling. 
3 Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations á Byzance. 
4 See Kaegi, Byzantine Military Unrest for specific case studies of civil unrest during the early and middle Byzantine period.  






place. If a weak or incompetent opponent was in power, usurpation was more likely to occur. 
On the other hand, the use of usurpation became troublesome in justification when dynasty and 
lineage came into prominence. To rebel against a centralised and strong emperor, like Emperor 
Justinian (AD 527-565), an internal insurrection, within the city or its immediate vicinity, was 
more probable compared to hostile activity originating in the peripheral provinces. For 
Justinian, the Nika Riot (AD 532) is a key example of how internal threats were more likely to 
overthrow the emperor than an external enemy.5 Nonetheless, to assume all usurpations 
followed a similar model when analysing the emperor’s position would be unfruitful. The 
position, location and attributes of the usurper also need to be examined and considered when 
validating certain rebellious actions.  
Between AD 1077-1081, five usurpations occurred. Those opposing Emperor Michael 
VII Doukas were Nikephoros Botaneiates who started his usurpation in the eastern province in 
July/October 1077 and Nikephoros Bryennios in the western provinces in November 1077. 
Nikephoros Basilakes in the summer of 1078, Nikephoros Melissenos in Autumn of 1080, and 
lastly, Alexios Komnenos in early 1081 usurped against Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates. 
This paper will focus on the usurpation of Nikephoros Bryennios and aims to reconstruct the 
events of the usurpation into a cohesive narrative and identify why the usurpation failed 
compared to his contemporary, Nikephoros Botaneiates.  
Usurpation is largely narrated through literature, nominally as stories of usurpers 
reaching, or failing to reach, the throne through means of vindication, justification, and 
legitimacy - a narrative of empire, power, and politics. Certain usurpers and their rise to power 
can be illustrated through numismatic imagery. In particular, the distinctions between a 
usurper’s image and their predecessors is an interesting topic to examine. However, due to the 
scope of this paper, and the strength of the literary source material, discussion will be 
concentrated on the literature.  
Davidson has acknowledged that Byzantine literature has allowed scholars to single out 
three notable types of usurpers.6 A usurper might act in self-defence in which they are not 
acting under their own beliefs or ‘wants’, instead they are forced to act against an individual or 
risk being killed. An example is Alexios Komnenos who rebelled against the Emperor 
Nikephoros Botaneiates in AD 1081 because of growing concerns of his own and his brother, 
                                               
5 Malalas, Chronographia. XVIII. 475-477. 
6 Davidson, The Glory of Ruling, 7-60.  






Isaac’s, lives.7 Alternatively, if we are to agree with Nikephoros’ depiction of Bryennios, then 
Bryennios would also fill this category, because it was his belief that fighting against the throne 
was not the correct measure.8 The second type of usurper might launch a usurpation ‘for the 
greater good.’ In this circumstance, the emperor or government had threatened the stability or 
survival of the empire and the last resort, or best option, to prevent collapse was to instigate a 
usurpation to thwart the ill-doing of the current regime. An example is Nikephoros Botaneiates, 
who took up arms against the Emperor Michael VII Doukas in AD 1078 in the hope to stabilise 
the empire’s frontiers.9 By dethroning Michael, Botaneiates would also remove his unpopular 
eunuch advisor Nikephoritzes. Lastly, a usurper might act in their own interests, and although 
this last factor might have played into the other two types of usurpations, rebelling solely on 
lust for power had no legitimacy. The first two types of usurpers are accepted by Byzantine 
authors as ‘just causes.’ However, an individual acting in self-interest was not accepted. Public 
opinion was often a factor where usurpers found legitimacy and through the contemporary 
populace condoning certain actions, it ultimately led to several authors conveying the same 
theme through their literary works. Despite this, successful usurpers often did carry legitimacy, 
simply by being successful in their coup. Once a usurper attained power and transitioned to 
emperor, it was up to them to solidify their position. One way a ‘usurper emperor’ might do 
this is by commissioning literary works to consolidate their position.10 Gaining legitimacy has 
always been easier for those who succeed rather than those who failed. Nonetheless, it is the 
justification and the factor of legitimacy which have influenced the literary accounts. The 
various stances and factors that came as a consequence of these literary bias’s will be examined 
later in the paper.  
Note: From this moment on, I will use Bryennios to denote the eleventh century usurper, also 
known as the elder, and for Nikephoros Bryennios the younger, consequently the twelfth 




                                               
7 Two notable courtiers known as Borilos and Germanus, who were close with the Emperor Nikephoros Botaneiates, made 
several life-threatening actions against the Komnenos brothers. Anna Komnena claims this was the main reason for their revolt 
in 1081. Komnena, Alexiad. II.I.  
8 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 5.  
9 Attaleiates, History. XXVII. 213-5; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 28.  
10 See Booth, The Ghost of Maurice and Frendo, History and Panegyric in the Age of Heraclius concerning Heraclius’ 
consolidation of legitimacy through literary frameworks. Neville, Heroes and Romans, 123, notes, ‘The extended discussions 
of Bryennios’ reluctance to rebel, and all the forces that drove him hesitantly to it, indicate that revolt was a great crime.’ 
Here Nikephoros is using his literary outlet to legitimatise and reconsolidate his families name. An example of how literary 
works were also used not only to solidify a winner’s position but also a usurper who failed.  






Prelude to Bryennios’ Usurpation  
At the turn of the eleventh century, the Byzantine Empire was re-established as a leading power 
in the Mediterranean.11 Emperor Basil II ruled the empire with surety and, as a result of his 
dedication and character, he expanded the empire its furthest in territory since Justinian’s 
reconquests in the sixth century. Nevertheless, the empire’s fortunes turned again after Basil’s 
death and the empire was plunged into strife. Traditionalist scholars have pointed towards the 
Battle of Manzikert in AD 1071, which led to a considerable territory in Anatolia being 
occupied by the Seljuk Turks. The Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes was taken captive and a 
new emperor was placed upon the throne, Michael VII Doukas.12  
Emperor Michael VII’s reign was troubled and unstable. The empire had pressure from 
both western and eastern theatres, most notably the Turks in Anatolia and the Serbs and Bulgars 
in the Balkans. Michael VII did not only face external threats, but also faced four rebellions 
throughout his reign which signalled the political instability of the period.13 In AD 1076, 
Nestor, an imperial governor of the Danube provinces rebelled against Michael’s regime and 
gained support from the nomadic Pechenegs. The reasoning behind Nestor’s rebellion is more 
important than its outcome because he was not trying to claim lordship over the Balkans, nor 
exhort money from the government. Instead he wanted Nikephoritzes removed from office.14 
Nestor’s rebellion was a clear sign of the dissatisfaction towards the eunuch Nikephoritzes. For 
too long had Michael’s government limited their resources towards the eastern front and as a 
result, it fell to the Turkish incursions. Nikephoritzes’ policies were aimed to recoup the 
empire’s financial reserve; however, he attained this revival through a vigorous economic 
policy, and it was these policies that sparked Nestor’s rebellion. This was not the first time that 
rebellion came from military dissatisfaction with economic policy.15  
Psellos’ Chronographia, depicts Michael VII in a moderate light. Michael was an 
individual who had potential to rule well, however from how events played out, this potential 
                                               
11 For the Byzantine revival, see Angold, The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204, 24-34; Holmes, Basil II and the Governance of 
Empire; Kaldellis, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood, 81-154 and Whittow, The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, 358-390.  
12 For the period following Basil II’s revival of the Byzantine Empire and consequent events surrounding Manzikert, see 
Angold, The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204, 35-80 and Kaldellis, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood, 231-251.  
13 The four rebellions against Emperor Michael VII were Russel Balliol in 1073, Nestor in 1076, Nikephoros Botaneiates in 
July/October 1077, and Nikephoros Bryennios in November 1077.  
14 Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 19. ‘Nestor said that he would take no other course unless they got rid of the logothetes 
Nikephoros as an enemy to all and implacable foe…’  
15 Emperor Maurice (582-602), deployed strict economic policies to cope with the limited treasury he inherited, however, this 
resulted in extensive dissatisfaction with his reign. Two rebellions were launched during Maurice’s reign over military pay 
[Th. Sim. History. III. 1.1 – 3.11; VIII. 6.2- 15.9]. Phokas’ rebellion in 602 was initiated due to Maurice’s economic policy 
and the decision to winter his troops beyond the frontier. Maurice and his family were consequently murdered during this 
rebellion and Phokas ascended to the throne in 602. 






was not utilised.16 However, unsurprisingly, Psellos left this out of his account, choosing to 
focus solely on the emperor’s character and not his policies. The decision to focus on the 
emperor’s character rather than his policies could be a strategic decision due to Psellos’ 
position at court.17 Psellos was not always in the emperor’s favour, and thus writing whilst 
Michael was still in power meant that Psellos could not afford to portray Michael in a negative 
way, regardless of whether Michael’s true character was unfavourable or not. This places 
doubts over Psellos’ depiction of Michael; however, as Attaleiates demonstrates in the History, 
Psellos’ depiction of Michael might hold some truth.18 A key absence in Psellos’ work is 
Nikephoritzes. Although Psellos’ Chronographia focussed mainly on the imperial rulers he did 
include entries on notable individuals during imperial reigns. An example is the Caesar John 
Doukas. So why did Psellos not include Nikephoritzes in his account? It is reasonable to argue, 
with Nikephoritzes absent, Psellos could focus on depicting a positive portrayal of Michael and 
with Nikephoritzes not included, there would be no association with the disliked character to 
his reign. By comparing Psellos’ depiction of Michael with Attaleiates’ account, it is evident 
the inclusion of Nikephoritzes alongside Michael VII, instigated an overall negative portrayal 
of the regime.19 However, what we are left with is an important distinction and one that was 
highlighted with Nestor’s rebellion in AD 1076.   
Attaleiates’ account of Michael makes the key distinction between Michael VII and his 
reign. By distancing Michael from his reign and consequently associating Nikephoritzes with 
the current regime, Attaleiates provides an anchor point for justifying and legitimising 
usurpation. Attaleiates does this by attacking the regime but not necessarily the emperor.  
‘…whatever the most-evil Nikephoros wished became an imperial decision to order.’20 
And ‘…swayed by Nikephoros’ evil influence.’21  
The emperor is thus depicted as a secondary character in the lead up to the events in AD 1077, 
however, because he was the current ruler and acting in a dangerous and harmful way to his 
people he must be deposed. Attaleiates thus challenges the strength of Michael’s character, but 
limits this to mere willpower, and instead attacks Nikephoritzes and his consequent hold over 
the emperor. Thereupon, Michael’s reign is termed tyrannical - not because of Michael himself 
                                               
16 Psellos, Chronographia. VIII. 2-6.  
17 See Treadgold, Middle Byzantine Historians, 271-308.  
18 Attaleiates, History. XXIII. 186-7. 
19 Attaleiates, an historian whose account favoured Nikephoros Botaneiates and as a result, would depict Michael VII in a 
negative light to legitimise Botaneiates’ usurpation. On the historiography of Attaleiates, see Krallis, Politics of Imperial 
Decline and Serving Byzantium’s Emperors.  
20 Attaleiates, History. XXII. 182.  
21 Ibid. XXIII. 184. 






being ruthless, but because of his incompetence as a ruler, his lack of will-power to stand on 
his own, and failure to recognise the problem with Nikephoritzes. In essence, Michael was not 
a tyrant but, by allowing Nikephoritzes near-complete control over policy, his reign was 
tyrannical.22 Attaleiates goes further and states that Michael acknowledged his wrongdoings 
but, as a result of his limited willpower, did not rectify his problems and thus left his potential 
wasted.23  
Skylitzes Continuatus gives a direct response why the empire was in such a sorrowful 
state and directs the blame towards poor policy and, more prominently, the ‘wickedness’ from 
those with influence, authority and power: 
‘The look of woe was everywhere and the Reigning City was filled with despair. Those 
in power gave no thought to curbing the daily injustices and the unlawful trials and 
exactions, but freely carried on with their oppressive and wicked policies just as though 
there was nothing at all the matter with the Romans, no war with foreign enemies, no 
divine wrath, no indigence and violence taking their toll on the populace in their daily 
life.’24 
Given the depictions of Emperor Michael VII by Attaleiates and Psellos, it raises the question 
whether strength of character could prevail over bad policy. In this instance, it clearly did not, 
and Michael did not heed such a positive depiction from Skylitzes’ account. It is clear that 
Michael was unable to atone for his bad decisions and was unable to impose his potential and 
better judgement against the eunuch advisor Nikephoritzes. From the source passages, Michael 
VII did not control the empire and was transfixed by his corrupt advisor. Thus, it is undeniable 
that Michael was a necessary casualty for the ‘good of the empire.’ This allowed contemporary 
usurpers to justify their usurpations through acting ‘for the greater good.’  
Nikephoros portrays Michael VII as a close supporter of Bryennios, and even goes as 
far as to consider appointing him to the position of Caesar in the late AD 1070s, but later 
retracts this to the title of doux.25 Nikephoros assumingly kept Bryennios linked to Michael to 
confer legitimacy to Bryennios, and as we will see later, it was initially Bryennios’ brother 
                                               
22 Ibid. XXIII. 188. ‘…τήν τυραννίδα του Μιχαήλ…’ - ‘…hated Michael’s tyranny…’ This passage can be interpreted in many 
ways. Attaleiates acknowledges Michael’s problem is not his conscious, but his willpower, and consequently Nikephoritzes’ 
hold over him. It is clear that Attaleiates meant that Michael’s reign is tyrannical, not Michael himself.   
23 Ibid. XXIII. 186-7. Michael made an address upon knowledge of Russel Balliol’s actions. ‘ “Men of the City and members 
of the Senate, I have heard dispiriting news such as no one has yet had to endure, and am on the brink of death. I am that 
Jonah of old, so take me and cast me into the sea, for it is because of my actions that such horrid and dark misfortunes are 
befalling the Romans.” His words implied a degree of regret for all that he had done wrong, yet his actions failed to confirm 
that and no change of course was to be seen, for he had surrendered himself to the worst counsel, as if he were rudderless.’  
24 Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 27. 
25 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 1, 2.  






John and another individual named Basilakes who planned to rebel against Michael. Although 
Nikephoros depicts Bryennios in good relations to Michael, he does not shy away from 
condemning his character. Noting that Michael was ‘a man who was cowardly in other respects 
and afraid, as they say, of his own shadow.’26 Despite Nikephoros’ negative portrayal of 
Michael and Nikephoritzes, he placed a greater justification for the empire’s struggles towards 
internal disruption such as the use of mercenaries and civil war.27 However, one cannot justify 
civil war and rebellion were the main reasons for instability. There needed to be a premise for 
these actions to occur. If the emperor was not acting in accordance and good faith towards the 
empire, it is unsurprising there was a continuous basis for rebellion and civil unrest. 
 
Reconstructing the Narrative 
 
 
Figure 1: Constantinople and the Strait. McGeer, E and Nesbitt, J. W, Byzantium in the Times of Trouble: The 
Continuation of the Chronicle of John Skylitzes, 1057-1079 (Leiden, 2020), 34. 
 
                                               
26 Ibid. III. 2. Also see ibid. III. 4.  
27 See Neville, Heroes and Romans, 63-74. Neville fully appreciates Nikephoros was presenting political thoughts on the 
decline of the empire and that involved the use of mercenaries and initiating rebellions. By doing so, Nikephoros depicts 
Bryennios as a ‘reluctant usurper’ in order to shield Bryennios’ diminished legitimacy after his rebellion was lost. As a result, 
Nikephoros covers all bases with Bryennios’ legitimacy by attributing Bryennios to the possible elevation to Caesar by 
Michael Doukas and therefore linking Bryennios with the imperial family. Secondly, by attributing Bryennios the ambience 
of a ‘reluctant usurper’ and the understanding of the religious and secular consequences of rebelling against God’s chosen 
representative. Lastly, Bryennios is attributed characteristics of a ‘martial hero’, and consequently the attributes an emperor 
needed and wanted. This included bravery, martial prowess, and conscience. 121-132. 







The narrative of Nikephoros Bryennios (the elder) is often overlooked in scholarly debate due 
to its unsuccessful nature. However, it is imperative that failed usurpations are also examined 
because it sheds light on the differences between success and failure. Henceforth, it is 
imperative to reconstruct the narrative of Bryennios’ coup, so that it may be compared and 
contrasted with, not only Botaneiates, but other usurpation attempts which succeeded and 
failed.  
Before the narrative is reconstructed, three points must be noted. Firstly, Anna 
Komnena only depicts events concerning Bryennios’ coup which involved her father, Alexios 
Komnenos.28 Anna states that those wishing to learn more about the rebellion should utilise her 
husband’s work, the Material for History.29 Thus, it can be debated whether Anna either agreed 
with Nikephoros’ narrative or simply did not want to contradict her husband’s work. 
Nonetheless, Anna did not believe that Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder needed further material 
written about him. Consequently, Anna clearly did not feel the same way about her father and 
believed his narrative needed embellishment.30 Thusly, Anna’s narrative on the Bryennios coup 
does instigate a clear bias towards a positive portrayal of her father in those events. At the same 
time, when one compares the character of Alexios to Bryennios during the Battle of Kalavrye 
(AD 1078), Anna deploys a valorous account of both generals.31 Anna is either demonstrating 
her loyalty to her husband’s depiction of Bryennios or believes that his character was true to 
what is described.  
Secondly, Attaleiates’ narrative presents Bryennios as an individual who had the 
potential characteristics and, due to his resources, capability to achieve success, but ultimately 
failed because of the mistakes he made throughout the usurpation. More so, in the aftermath of 
the usurpation period of AD 1077/8, it was crucial to secure justification and legitimacy for 
key individuals, such as Botaneiates and Alexios. These literary depictions of the major 
characters influence their actions during the Bryennios and Botaneiates coups. This led to a 
relatively negative depiction of Bryennios’ actions and its effects on the empire. These negative 
depictions of Bryennios explains why Nikephoros decided he needed to justify and re-
legitimise Bryennios’ actions in the Material for History. Ultimately, Bryennios led a military 
                                               
28 See Stanković, Bryennios, Komnene, and Doukas: A Story of Different Perspectives and Treadgold, Middle Byzantine 
Historians, 343-386 for the relationship between Anna and Nikephoros’s narratives.  
29 Komnena, Alexiad. I. IV.  
30 Ibid. Preface, 17-21.  
31 Ibid. I. V-VI. 






rebellion in the West and Botaneiates led a relative peaceful coup in the East, both against a 
tyrannical regime. The main difference was Botaneiates focussed on public support and 
monopolising internal strife to combat his desired non-military inspired insurrection, whereas 
Bryennios led a relative military focussed assault against Michael and Nikephoritzes. 
Attaleiates makes no mention of the reasoning behind Bryennios’ rebellion, nor any 
background to his character. This instantly made Bryennios less connectable to Attaleiates’ 
audience compared to Botaneiates. Attaleiates and Skylitzes were the main literary authors of 
the time, which left little room for a positive review of Bryennios. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean there were no positive depictions of Bryennios. Certain anecdotes or verbal stories in the 
western provinces may have been established, but with none remaining or written, we must 
accept the narratives of Attaleiates and Skylitzes as the main sources for information during 
the period.32 One important point to highlight is Attaleiates provides no clear prejudice against 
the character of Bryennios; only the actions of his usurpation, therefore showcasing the clear 
difference in Botaneiates and Bryennios coups and his ultimate bias towards Botaneiates.33    
Throughout this turbulent time, Alexios Komnenos was constantly involved in the 
action. Alexios was present and fought against several of the late eleventh century usurpations. 
Henceforth, Alexios learnt valuable lessons that he then applied to his own usurpation. This 
was not only achieved in reality, but through literary transmission from the eleventh into the 
twelfth century. Both, Anna and Nikephoros highlight the importance and significant 
consequences of certain actions. There are two main themes that are particularly relevant to 
this paper, however, it is undeniable there are further literary connections. The first literary 
transmission concerned the problem of using multi-ethnic forces in a show of strength in trying 
to gain public support. As we will see from Bryennios’ usurpation, a show of force combined 
with the use of foreign forces was not the best way to inspire support.34 Secondly, the reluctant 
                                               
32 It should be noted Attaleiates and Skylitzes would not have been generally accessible to the wider public, mostly reserved 
for the aristocracy. So as stated, there might have been verbal stories told about Bryennios’ usurpation, but given the precarities 
of speaking against the emperor, especially once his reign was secure, it is not surprising they were not recorded.  
33 Given the depiction of Bryennios in the Material for History, it could be confusing for Attaleiates to know who was really 
leading the usurpation attempt. What is clear is that Nikephoros Bryennios was the identifiable individual who was seemingly 
making the commands, but it was the coup’s actions which were targeted by Attaleiates, and largely undertaken by John, and 
therefore not directly assaulting Nikephoros Bryennios’ character. Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 242-3, 250-2. 
34 Komnena, Alexiad. II. IX. ‘The Komnene however were of the opinion that Constantinople would not easily be captured: 
their own forces composed of different elements, native and foreign, and where there is any heterogeneous group, there is 
discordant voices will surely be raised.’ See also Neville, Heroes and Romans, 63-74. Although Botaneiates acquired Turkish 
troops under his banner, he sent a largely Roman detachment of troops to camp outside Constantinople’s walls and the public 
were overjoyed to see Roman troops. ‘They all thus lifted their voices and gave thanks to God, as they saw Roman forces and 
tents having arrived in this place, because a long time had passed since the area as a whole had seen any Romans.’ Attaleiates, 
History. XXXII. 267.  






usurper is a literary concept that Neville has attached to Nikephoros’ Material for History.35 
Nikephoros’ portrayal of Bryennios encompassed the characteristics of a reluctant usurper in 
order to legitimise his grandfather’s actions in the preceding century. Anna continued this 
literary construction and used it as a tool for acquiring legitimacy and justification in her 
narrative for Alexios’ coup. Anna adds the image of the reluctant usurper through her narration 
of Borilos and Germanos, alongside the discussion within the Komnenoi camp concerning who 
should be the emperor between Alexios and Isaac.36 There may two explanations for the literary 
continuation. Nikephoros and Anna either implemented it into their narratives of Bryennios 
and Alexios to legitimatise their own ‘reluctant’ actions in their alleged usurpation against John 
Komnenos.37 Alternatively, the decision to use the idea of a reluctant usurper arose when Anna 
and Nikephoros were exiled and collaborated with one another on their individual works.38 
Defining the reason for the construction of the ‘reluctant usurper’ is not instrumental to the 
overall point of this paper. However. it is still an important issue to consider when examining 
the historiographical aspect of Byzantine authors writing on usurpation, and how prior 
usurpations impacted the method and means of future usurpers. 
…………………….. 
Bryennios’ rebellion was ignited with the full support of his troops and the western aristocracy 
in November AD 1077.39 Attaleiates and Skylitzes do not provide reasons concerning the 
rebellion’s initiation, but from Nikephoros’ account it seems the main cause was displeasure 
with Emperor Michael VII’s reign.40 John Bryennios, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder’s 
brother, mustered troops from the western provinces which included Macedonian regiments, a 
number of Varangians, and Frankish troops. Bryennios also gained the support of the Katepano 
of Adrianople, alongside forming an alliance with the Pechenegs, and set a rallying point for 
Traianoupolis. Michael’s response to the Bryennios threat was slow and negligible, and put far 
greater urgency in dealing with Botaneiates in the East. Michael had the opportunity to 
manoeuvre Basilakes’ troops to engage Bryennios’ mustering forces, and it likely would have 
put an end to the rebellion, however, the emperors’ attention laid with Botaneiates.41 Basilakes 
                                               
35 Neville, Heroes and Romans, 121-138. For a pictorial survey of reluctant usurpers see Davidson, The Glory of Ruling, 95 – 
figure 1. For an overview of reluctant usurpers, outside of Bryennios, see Davidson, The Glory of Ruling, 94-142. 
36 Komnena, Alexiad. II. I [Borilos and Germanus]; I. VII [Komnenoi camp]. 
37 Choniatēs, Annals, I. 10-11. 
38 Jeffreys, Nikephoros Bryennios Reconsidered, 201-14. 
39 Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 242-3; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 29.  
40 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 4.  
41 Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 243-4; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 29, 30. Skylitzes notes that Basilakes did not engage with 
Bryennios’ forces prudently or decisively and attributes some blame towards Basilakes. However, if Basilakes did conduct a 
secret agreement with John Bryennios then it is unlikely Skylitzes had knowledge of this. Therefore, his actions were plausible. 






was eventually moved to engage Bryennios, however, after a small skirmish, Bryennios forces 
were triumphant and Basilakes was forced to re-affirm his allegiance to the Bryennios 
insurrection.42 Following these events, the Bryennios brothers gathered at Traianoupolis to 
merge their forces. Bryennios was eventually acclaimed and received the royal insignia at 
Traianoupolis.43 
Attaleiates’ and Skylitzes’ accounts do not state the justification for Bryennios’ 
decision to spark rebellion, and consequently do not provide information concerning the 
internal decisions and events within the western provinces. For this reason, Nikephoros is a 
crucial source. Nikephoros either wanted to rectify the missing information from Attaleiates’ 
and Skylitzes’ accounts concerning the internal management of the Bryennios coup or 
alternatively, because Attaleiates’ and Skylitzes’ accounts did not detail Bryennios’ reasonings, 
Nikephoros decided it was the perfect opportunity to provide retrospective legitimacy towards 
Bryennios’ rebellion.44 It is plausible Nikephoros was doing both because the origins of the 
usurpation was expanded extensively. Despite Nikephoros’ efforts, it did not change the reality 
that Bryennios, eventually, took the lead in the rebellion. In the Material for History, Bryennios 
did not wish to rebel against the emperor because of his better judgement towards the action’s 
consequences, nor did he receive the royal insignia under his own desires, but instead was 
coerced into the action by his brother.45 From the start of the rebellion, it was Bryennios’ 
brother John who instigated the coup alongside the volatile support of Basilakes and 
Nikephoros, alluding to John’s continued struggle to compel Bryennios to join the cause.46 
Bryennios only agreed to adorn the imperial insignia and lead the rebellion after an act of 
trickery at Traianoupolis.47 Although Nikephoros’ additions concerning events leading up to 
Traianoupolis might be viewed as rhetoric to justify and legitimise Bryennios’ actions, it does 
                                               
Skylitzes also notes other immediate forces were available to thwart Bryennios, but Michael did not utilise these troops, and 
thus acted irresponsibly and slowly.  
42 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 8. The original agreement that Basilakes would join the Bryennios coup was made with 
John and not Nikephoros [III. 4]. Basilakes’ thinking is not presented to us at that moment. If Michael had moved Basilakes 
earlier we must ask, would Basilakes acted the same and tried to quell Bryennios’ forces, and if he succeeded (which he did 
not) would he remain loyal to his prior agreement with John Bryennios? Nonetheless, Basilakes’ uneasy loyalty to either 
Michael or the Bryennios brothers highlights the internal instability of the empire and how individuals were more likely to act 
in their self-interests than for the good of the state.  
43 In Attaleiates’ and Skylitzes’ accounts, Bryennios openly received these honours and proclaimed himself in open rebellion 
against Michael. Nonetheless, Nikephoros retains the position that Bryennios was eventually persuaded into condemning his 
open conscience. Bryennios, Material for History. III. 9-10.  
44 Skylitzes mentions Bryennios was proclaimed before his entry into Adrianople [Continuatus. VI. 29] but received the royal 
insignia at Traianoupolis [Continuatus. VI. 30], whereas Attaleiates attributes both these events to Traianoupolis [History. 
XXXI. 246-7].  
45 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 7.  
46 Ibid. III. 4 [for John’s decision to initiate rebellion], 7, 9 [for Bryennios’ refusal to join John in his venture].  
47 Ibid. III. 9-10.  






bring forward an interesting question: which brother believed in and wanted the cause to 
succeed the most? Neville argues that once Bryennios joined the rebellion, albeit hesitantly, he 
became fully involved and became a strong figurehead.48 Therefore, Bryennios either embraced 
his decision or Nikephoros again blended truth with uncertainty by depicting Bryennios, no 
longer as a secondary character to his brother, but as a strong and confident individual. These 
attributes are needed for successful rulership.  
The Bryennios brothers set out to Adrianople with their troops, and on arrival were 
greeted with happiness. John, alongside other key supporters of the rebellion, were given 
honours and the populace pulled down the phoundax in retaliation to Nikephoritzes’ economic 
policies and their recent ‘liberation’ and pledged support for Bryennios.49 Raidestos also 
pledged their support to Bryennios. Bryennios had built enough support to feel confident 
enough to try and secure the loyalty and public opinion of Constantinople.50 Bryennios sent his 
brother John, with a reasonably large force, to Constantinople in the hope to either win the city 
through fear or by the Constantinopolitan populace embracing him, thus igniting an internal 
struggle against Michael from within the city. However, Bryennios misjudged the situation. 
John arrived to find the ambience of the capital to be hostile and after a few skirmishes ensued 
along the city walls (Skylitzes notes these were located along the wall of the Blachernai), he 
was repulsed.51 John became frustrated with the situation and consequently ventured over the 
bridge of St Panteleëmon and torched the local suburbs. This left the city’s population furious 
and John’s goal of gaining the capital’s public support tarnished.  
The Material for History offers a different perspective.52 John was sent to the capital to 
persuade the populace to join Bryennios’ cause and the populace welcomed seeing John’s men. 
However, some of John’s troops, unknowing to him, secretly went to ‘find food for their camp,’ 
but in reality, were aiming to secure booty from the city’s suburbs. When the soldiers found 
nothing, they set fire to the local area in a rage. John tried to stop his soldiers’ actions, but the 
destruction got out of control and, to avoid losing face, John decided to besiege the capital. 
However, after several rebuttals, John decided that he did not want to risk his men’s lives for 
                                               
48 Neville, Heroes and Romans, 125.  
49 Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 247, 249-50; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 30 [Skylitzes does not place this at Adrianople, but at 
Traianoupolis and does not record both Bryennios brothers making their way to Adrianople – instead John makes his way to 
Constantinople from Traianoupolis and presumably Skylitzes omits Bryennios’ travel to Adrianople despite appearing later in 
the city when the Pechenegs arrived to besiege it. Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 33]; Bryennios, Material for History. III. 10-11. 
See Davidson, The Glory of Ruling, 49-5, nt. 255.  
50 Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 32. 
51 Ibid. VI. 32. 
52 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 11-14.  






further failure and consequently lifted the siege. John, embarrassed that he had produced no 
result, needed a pretext for returning to Adrianople, but at the same time needed to obtain 
something to save himself from humiliation. News had come that a marauding group of 
Pechenegs had entered over the Haemus Mountains and started to plunder the villages of 
Chersonese.53 Upon returning back to Adrianople, John defeated the marauding Pechenegs and 
took many captives. Bryennios used these captives to stop the Pecheneg siege of Adrianople 
that had pinned his brother within the city, and a new alliance was formed between them.54 
This narration of events is highly rhetorical and is an example of Nikephoros taking liberties 
with his position of writing in hindsight. Thus, it is prudent to return to events which had a 
higher probability of occurring.  
In early January AD 1078, John decided to fall back from Constantinople and not risk 
further angering the capital’s populace or fall upon a military retaliation from local imperial 
forces. John, with two tagmata, fell back to Athyra and sent his remaining forces to winter, 
presumably at Adrianople.55 Michael realised John’s precarious position and freed Russel 
Balliol, who he had previously captured during his reign, and sent him alongside the proedros 
Alexios Komnenos with imperial forces to engage in battle. The imperial land forces were 
accompanied by an allied Rus naval contingent, which were also used to engage with John’s 
forces. Michael’s imperial forces were successful and forced John to retreat further back 
towards Raidestos.56 At the same time John retreated to Raidestos, the Pechenegs decided it 
was an opportune moment to exploit the Macedonian pretender.57 The Pechenegs ravaged the 
neighbouring lands in Macedonia and besieged Bryennios in Adrianople, causing a significant 
halt to his imperial ventures. Bryennios paid off the Pechenegs over the winter of 1077/8, 
however, the siege had taken its toll, leaving the western coup crippled with famine, alongside 
depleted manpower and financial reserves.58 Once the Pechenegs had lifted their siege, John, 
in March 1078, was ordered to raise support and taxes from the promontory of Kyzikos. John 
was successful, however upon his return, he was set upon by an imperial fleet and defeated, 
                                               
53 Peter Bell believes Nikephoros is fabricating the events to avoid damaging John’s prestige. Nikephoros notes the Pechengs 
took advantage of their previous alliance with the Bryennios brothers, and their consequent limited number of troops in the 
Balkans, in order to plunder the local villages and encircle Adrianople. As Peter Bell believes, it is likely that these events are 
fabricated to justify John’s withdrawal. See, Bryennios, Material for History. III. 14. nt. 99.   
54 Nikephoros associates this event as an establishment of an alliance between the Pechenegs and Bryennios. However, given 
the narrative of Skylitzes and Attaleiates, it is more likely that this event concluded an uneasy feeling and resulted in hostilities 
and the subsequent Pecheneg siege of Adrianople which Nikephoros fails to mention, but Attaleiates and Skylitzes provide.  
55 Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 252; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 32.  
56 Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 252-255, XXXII. 261; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 33.  
57 Attaleiates, History. XXXII. 261-2. ‘But the Pechenegs considered that the rebellion of the Macedonians was a boon and 
benefit for themselves and so in great numbers they approached Adrianople…’; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 33.  
58 Attaleiates, History. XXXII. 262-3. Bryennios’ decision to pay off the Pechenegs likely occurred in early 1078.  






and once again forced to retreat further inland. Concerning Constantinople, upon Botaneiates’ 
imminent arrival from the East, the Constantinopolitan populace occupied the city on his 
behalf, and Russel caught up with John’s remnant forces and once again defeated them.59 On 
the 24th March 1078, Botaneiates was proclaimed within Constantinople, and Michael VII was 
deposed. A few days later, Botaneiates entered Constantinople victorious.60 This left Bryennios 
in a precarious position.    
Botaneiates wanted no further bloodshed and dispatched three different envoys to 
Bryennios, offering him the rank of Caesar and restoration of his previous titles, alongside 
titles for other notable officials within Bryennios’ camp.61 On all occasions Bryennios refused. 
Bryennios mustered his forces and marched from Adrianople towards Constantinople. 
Botaneiates dispatched the newly elevated nobelissimos and megas domestikos Alexios 
Komnenos, alongside Russel Balliol, with an imperial force to thwart Bryennios. The imperial 
forces camped at Kalavrye and it was at this location that the two forces meet each other on the 
battlefield.62 Alexios was victorious and left Bryennios’ forces defeated. The Bryennios 
brothers were captured and taken to Constantinople, where John was executed and Bryennios 
blinded.63 The Bryennios family’s estates in the western provinces remained under their 
authority, thus leaving them defeated but not crippled. These events concluded the Bryennios 
rebellion.64 
 
Why Did Bryennios Fail?  
Bryennios’ usurpation had advantageous characteristics, but its demise came from a sequence 
of poor decisions concerning the operation and consequent actions of the coup. This section of 
the article aims to give some preliminary thoughts as to why Bryennios failed and allow for 
further discussion to be taken in the future.  
                                               
59 Ibid. XXXII. 270; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 33. 
60 Nikephoritzes was arrested, banished, and later died. The location is disputed between Nikephoros [III. 26. – Island of 
Oxeia] and Skylitzes [VII. 15. – Island of Prote].   
61 Ibid. XXXIV. 284-5.; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VII. 2. On the use of reconciliation between emperor and usurper see 
Davidson, The Glory of Ruling, 247-71.  
62 Attaleiates [XXXIV. 289-91], Anna Komnena [I. V-VI], Bryennios [IV. 5-14] and Skylitzes [VII. 3] all provide accounts 
of the battle.  
63 Botaneiates awarded titles to Bryennios despite his decision to blind him. However, once Bryennios was blinded and thus 
condemned to never sit upon the throne, Botaneiates had no quarrel with, nor deemed any threat from, the usurper. For physical 
features and the throne, see Laes, ‘Power, Infirmity and ‘Disability.’ Despite, Bryennios being blinded, the execution of John 
Bryennios could be interpreted to highlight that he was the main threat to Botaneiates. The decision to execute John also 
demonstrates there might be some truth in Nikephoros’ account depicting John as the main leader and instigator of the 
rebellion.  
64 Attaleiates, History. XXXIV. 292-4; Bryennios, Material for History. IV. 17.  






Bryennios mustered good quality troops from the western provinces. These troops 
comprised Franks, Byzantine regulars from the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, 
Varangians, and Pecheneg warriors from the Nomadic Steppe. Bryennios had the manpower 
and quality of troops to enact a successful coup. Despite initiating his coup in the form of a 
military rebellion which became a detriment, the quality of manpower demonstrated his martial 
following. Thus, when comparing Bryennios’ military might against his usurper rival 
Botaneiates, the advantage laid with Bryennios. Although troop numbers were not always the 
key for success, good quality troops were often significant in firstly, posing yourself as a viable 
threat; and secondly, to exercise that threat level onto your enemies in a bid to win the throne.65 
Despite having a positive military backing, it was the execution of these military forces in his 
bid to win public support that ultimately cost him the imperial throne.    
Bryennios’ character and personal attributes demonstrated the correct image of a 
usurper. Both Botaneiates and Bryennios had this positive factor, and both derived benefit. 
However, Botaneiates utilised it more effectively than Bryennios through consistently 
generating greater propaganda output into the capital.66 Additionally, Bryennios was a member 
of the western aristocracy and had high-ranking family members and ancestry.67 Lineage was 
important when assessing a usurper’s suitability for imperial rule, alongside awarding certain 
secular ranks and military titles. Kazhdan and Epstein stress being a member of the old military 
aristocracy and holding a substantial genealogy was a significant factor in determining secular, 
ecclesiastical, and public opinion on a chosen candidate.68 Thus, Kazhdan would argue that 
because of Botaneiates’ greater ancestry, and experience in the maintenance and protection of 
the empire, he would have had a greater approval from the various classes over Bryennios.69 
On the other hand, Kaldellis believes lineage does not provide an instrumental impact on 
suitability, and instead emphasises the significance of the usurper’s age and military strength.70 
                                               
65 Komnena, Alexiad. I. V. ‘Bryennios, confident in his soldiers, relied on his knowledge and the good discipline of his troops.’  
66 Attaleiates, History, XXVII. 216-20; Kazhdan and Epstein, Change in Byzantine Culture, 102-11. 
67 Komnena, Alexiad. I. IV.  
68 Kazhdan and Epstein, Change in Byzantine Culture, 102-11. The emphasis of Kazhdan and Epstein’s arguments are founded 
upon the popular and credible statement that the eleventh century saw the rise of the aristocratic families. These aristocratic 
families, the Doukai, Komnenoi, Melissenoi, and Palaiologoi were the principle families that intensified the personification of 
lineage and heritage in the eleventh century. The factors of lineage and legitimacy played a significant role in the perception 
and legitimacy of a candidate and their respective family name. For further discussion see, Kazhdan and Epstein, Change in 
Byzantine Culture and Krallis, Politics of Imperial Decline.  
69 For Botaneiates’ ancestry see Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 28; Attaleiates, History. XXIX, XXXIV. 288 [Botaneiates’ 
outburst after Bryennios’ refusal of terms–Botaneiates claims greater ancestry]. 
70 Kaldellis, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood, 264. Kaldellis argues, despite Botaneiates having several positive attributes, at 
nearly eighty years old and with diminished military capability in only holding three hundred men at the time of his usurpation 






As a result, Kaldellis would favour the younger, but yet still experienced, Bryennios over the 
older Botaneiates.71 Although age is a crucial factor, it is only worth applying its impact once 
the individual is in power. An aged individual might struggle with performing personal heroic 
deeds on the battlefield, but it would not take away from their military capability for 
undertaking a reserved leadership role which focussed on strategic elements compared to hand-
to-hand combat.72 Once an individual was on the throne, the age of the candidate became an 
issue. If they were too old to produce heirs or had no heirs, their death would create another 
power vacuum. Furthermore, inciting disruption to the state through a succession crisis.73  
Bryennios was also present at the Battle of Manzikert, where he is described as fighting 
valiantly, much like his later depiction against Alexios at Kalavrye.74 By placing Bryennios at 
the Battle of Manzikert - despite the result - it established his military competency and 
characteristics of bravery and loyalty.75 In accordance to Nikephoros’ account, Bryennios did 
not want to rebel, suggesting that he wanted to seek other measures of bringing down a 
tyrannical regime - presenting a reserved and virtuous individual. These personal attributes 
personify the character of Bryennios and produced the perception of a legitimate claimant to 
the throne. Nonetheless, the public perception of Bryennios did deteriorate. 
‘When the letter reached him in Dyrrachium, <Bryennios> was full of anxiety; he did 
know what to do: to enter into revolt he thought dangerous and the cause of the greatest 
evils, while to deliver himself into manifest danger, while despising all the 
                                               
initiation (within a couple of months Botaneiates attained support from several Turkish military groups to bolster his military 
strength), the advantage laid with Bryennios who was younger, had favourable lineage, and a strong military backing. On the 
use of Turkish mercenaries see Beihammer, Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia, 198-243. 
71 Kaldellis, ‘How to Usurp the Throne in Byzantium, 43-56. Kaldellis presents a more balanced approach to the idea of lineage 
in relation to public opinion.  
72 Despite Attaleiates’ portrayal of Botaneiates as a competent military general, see Kaldellis, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood,  
266 for Botaneiates not attaining military victories, and discussion in Krallis, Politics of Imperial Decline, 144-148. Also see 
Krallis, Politics of Imperial Decline, 148 for an opposing argument from the one given, concerning how military competency, 
age, and lineage could not be overcome by literary imagery and flattery.  
73 Although an emperor might not produce an heir themselves, this did not stop them from adopting sons in lieu of their 
respective succession. An early example of adoption is Justin II and Tiberius and furthermore, Tiberius adopting Maurice 
through marriage in the late sixth century. Theoph. Sim. History. III. 11. 4; I. 1. 5.  
74 For the Battle of Manzikert: Attaleiates does not give a detailed portrayal of Bryennios at Manzikert but does note his 
attendance [History. XX. 154-55]. However, this is not unexplainable considering Bryennios’ demonstration of martial 
prowess in other sources and the negative actions of Botaneiates during the Manzikert campaign [see Skylitzes, Continuatus. 
V. 3]. Skylitzes depicts Bryennios in a two-fold manner; Bryennios was clearly a capable fighter and demonstrates his ability 
during the campaign, however, he also notes that he left Basilakes outmanoeuvred, which resulted in his capture. Although 
this is not a great depiction of generalship, it is likely the fault came as a result of poor communication [Continuatus. V. 8-10]. 
Nikephoros presents a brighter depiction of the events; nonetheless, Bryennios’ martial skill is not disputed in any source.  For 
the Battle of Kalavrye: Attaleiates, History. XXXIV. 289-292; Bryennios, Material for History. IV. 5-14; Komnena, Alexiad. 
I. V-VI. Skylitzes, Continuatus. VII. 3. All accounts depict a fierce and test-worthy battle. For Attaleiates, Bryennios presents 
himself as a worthy foe for Alexios to conquer and does not take away from the martial prowess of Bryennios. Within all the 
depictions, Bryennios is shown to be courageous and skilful, and this is evident when he charges into battle at its pinnacle 
moment [Kalavrye], resulting in him being consequently captured compared to a large number of his men who fled the battle 
once it had turned for the worst.  
75 For discussion on Bryennios’ good deeds at Manzikert, see Neville, Heroes and Romans, 132-3.  






consequences, he did not judge to be the act of a good, an intelligent or a noble man.  
He remained wrestling with these thoughts for a long time…’ (Bryennios, Material for 
History, III. 5, trans. Peter Bell) 
Neville’s judgement of Nikephoros’ portrayal towards Bryennios as a ‘reluctant usurper’ is 
correct, however, it is also rhetorical. Although it was created to justify and provide a relative 
sense of legitimacy for Bryennios, its use does not condone the Bryennios brother’s consequent 
actions or John’s troops concerning Constantinople’s suburbs. The term ‘reluctance’ was only 
used at the start of Nikephoros’ narration of events. This is sensible, but as Neville notes, it is 
also necessary.76 Despite being reluctant to usurp Michael’s throne, Bryennios, once in a 
position of being “one aspiring to being emperor,” “o basileion,” he needed to reconfirm his 
martial virtues and thusly, be depicted as a worthy and reputable candidate for throne.77 
Furthermore, Bryennios, although reluctant, needed to be fully in control of his forces and 
decisive in his decision making. The true embodiment of Bryennios’ character and virtues is 
depicted during his final battle with Alexios at Kalavrye.78   
As previously noted, Attaleiates and Skylitzes provide no cogent character passages of 
Bryennios in their accounts. Skylitzes only offers one vignette into Bryennios’ character, and 
Attaleiates makes no attempt to offer a depiction of Bryennios until he is pitched against 
Botaneiates and thusly portrays Bryennios in a horrific manner.79 An important point to 
remember is that neither account portrays Bryennios whilst he was still in a position to 
challenge for the imperial throne. The depictions we are offered only arrive after the ‘saviour’ 
Botaneiates had claimed the throne or was confident in its capture. Neither account offers a 
character passage for Bryennios in which many authors undertake when introducing new 
individuals to their narrative. The omission of Bryennios’ character in their initial accounts 
suggests that they either knew very little of Bryennios. Nevertheless, given their status and 
access to records and other materials it seems unlikely they would not have found some 
information. Alternatively, they chose to leave his character out of their accounts. It is only 
when Botaneiates had contact with Bryennios, and consequently when Attaleiates wanted to 
mirror these two individuals against one another that we are then offered a glimpse into 
                                               
76 Neville, Heroes and Romans, 124-5.  
77 Ibid. 125.  
78 Bryennios, Material for History. IV. 5-14; Komnena, Alexiad. I. V-VI. For discussion, see Neville, Heroes and Romans, 
125-131.  
79 Skylitzes, Continuatus. VII. 2; Attaleiates, History. XXXII. 262-3. Attaleiates’ account portrays Bryennios immediately 
after the Pecheneg siege and the consequent famine which broke out – a time undoubtedly that a leader would not heed to a 
good portrayal.  






Bryennios’ character. By doing so, they distanced Bryennios from their audiences, and in 
particular for Attaleiates, away from the ‘legitimate’ Botaneiates.80 Attaleiates might have been 
concerned with portraying Bryennios because depictions of Bryennios as brave, martial, and 
smart would have accredited him with legitimacy in-so-much that he carried the desired 
characteristics of a ruler. In comparison, it is no surprise that Nikephoros and Anna provide a 
detailed account of Bryennios’ attributes, portraying him as noble and heroic individual in his 
quest to fight tyranny.81 A true depiction of Bryennios, outside of his actions, is excluded from 
the other contemporary sources. This may be a result of various reasons - however, it may be, 
and is likely, that neither Skylitzes nor Attaleiates wanted to give Bryennios a platform for 
people to connect with outside of his actions. Furthermore, this implies Anna and Nikephoros’ 
account of Bryennios’ character may have solid foundations and hold truth.82 The portrayal of 
Bryennios in the sources is reminiscent of the Emperor Michael VII Doukas. Both individuals 
had the ability to be a righteous and prosperous ruler, but their actions did not correlate to their 
potential.  
Despite owning these positive factors, Bryennios could not rely upon them alone; it was 
his actions that would either win or lose him the chance to claim the throne. Unfortunately for 
Bryennios, he made four major mistakes during his bid for the throne. Although Nikephoros 
presents a series of justifications for many of Bryennios’ decisions, the following mistakes 
were still carried out and thus, the outcome was unchanged.  
Bryennios’ first mistake was that he launched an armed rebellion against the emperor. 
This usurpation attempt had ramifications with image and legitimacy. None of the 
contemporary sources state Botaneiates’ coup caused the East to break into chaos, but they do 
state that Bryennios’ did.83 Even Anna does not shy away from this point.84 Consequently, 
Bryennios’ rebellion took relative immediate action compared to Botaneiates’ slower and 
steadier approach. Whilst Botaneiates did call a usurpation, he instead called for a stand against 
                                               
80 Attaleiates only provides a snippet into Bryennios’ character once he is pitched against Botaneiates and one last time when 
he was blinded. The former depiction is provided with a stark contrasting portrayal to Botaneiates’ character. For this reason, 
the depiction of Bryennios is likely personified in a negative light to allow the audience to lean towards favouring Botaneiates, 
resulting in solidifying Botaneiates’ legitimacy through strength of character. Attaleiates, History. XXXIV. 286. The later 
depiction is once again to confirm Botaneiates’ legitimacy and character by enacting clemency and wisdom, whilst depicting 
Bryennios in a contrasting view. Attaleiates, History. XXXIV. 292-4.  
81 Bryennios, Material for History, III. 3, 5, IV. 15; Komnena, Alexiad. I. IV-VI.  
82 Anna does not shy away from stating Bryennios’ actions caused disruption and chaos in the western provinces, and this 
demonstrates her ability to be somewhat impartial in her depiction of Bryennios [Alexiad. I. IV]. Again, we are left with 
Bryennios’ actions are negative, but his character and attributes are positive. Bryennios, in the mind of Anna, was a flawed 
hero.  
83 Attaleiates, History. XXXI. 242-3; Skylitzes, Continuatus, VI. 29 
84 Komnena, Alexiad. I. IV. 






Michael’s regime, and still undertook many of his vital duties as doux of Anatolikon by 
protecting the eastern frontier from Turkish raiding forces.85 This ushered a sense of defiance 
towards Michael, but duty and loyalty to the empire, whereas Bryennios’ coup was an outright 
rebellion against Michael and, consequently, the empire. This shows the difference between 
the usurpation paths taken by the two usurpers. As a result, an initiation of a military rebellion 
had major repercussions for Bryennios and his chances for success. Through putting the effort 
and resources into an armed rebellion, it called into question Bryennios’ motives and 
ultimately, how he might have ruled the empire.86 If we are to take Attaleiates’ and Skylitzes’ 
versions of events, then the actions of John’s troops outside Constantinople was a key example 
of how one should not act in command of a liberation force. Even if we take Nikephoros’ 
account, John was still not able to control his men, and with the empire in a fragile state and 
loyalties divided - which was also demonstrated on the grand scale at Manzikert - an emperor 
could not afford such mistakes. When Bryennios’ and Botaneiates’ usurpations are compared, 
a subtle and softer approach was needed to claim the throne. When winning over the public, a 
reserved approach also increased the image of the usurper and established a case for legitimacy. 
This was a key mistake for Bryennios as it outlined his intentions straight away and placed 
doubts on his image, legitimacy, and intent. 
The second mistake that contributed to Bryennios’ failed usurpation was allying with 
the Pechenegs. The Pechenegs for Bryennios, and for many of their other allies throughout 
history, were a volatile ally to obtain.87 Bryennios’ alliance with the Pechenegs cost him time 
and resources. The Pechenegs were a nomadic group and revered themselves on martial 
prowess and strength.88 Furthermore, when Bryennios lost multiple engagements early on it 
demonstrated that not only was he unfit to rule, but was a prime target to take advantage of 
whilst in a vulnerable state. Bryennios became stuck within Adrianople’s walls, unable to 
manoeuvre or intervene in the capital's politics. This allowed Botaneiates to take his time, plan, 
and calculate his approach to the capital and once again, Bryennios’ offensive approach to his 
usurpation turned against him. The siege of Adrianople which trapped Bryennios within the 
city, was another key turning point. The Pecheneg siege caused a great famine, and for 
                                               
85 Attaleiates, History. XXVII. 215. Skylitzes, Continuatus, VI. 35. See Davidson, The Glory of Ruling, 140-41 in lieu of 
primary sources for solidification concerning Botaneiates’ perceived ‘reluctant’ but ‘legitimate’ usurpation. 
86 Rapoport, Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation, 560-1.  
87 For Pechenegs in contemporary sources, see Const. Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio; Komnena’s Alexiad; Leo 
the Deacon’s History; Attaleiates’ History; and Skylitzes History and Continuatus. For modern works on the Pechenegs, see 
Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians; Curta, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages,178-429; Kozlov, ‘More than 
Enemies’ and Meško’s two articles from Meško, Research Methodology in Ancient and Byzantine History. 
88 Const. Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio. 1, 6.  






Bryennios, it cost him much of his treasury and resources. Once the siege was lifted, Bryennios 
faced multiple problems. He needed to feed his people, pay his troops, and ultimately had to 
accept that he could not further his usurpation attempt until he accomplished these things. 
While John’s mission to Kyzikos was promising, the consequent defeat of John by an imperial 
fleet meant Bryennios was left with perpetual dilemmas and could not alleviate them. The 
Pechenegs had cost Bryennios support, valuable time, and resources. During the latter part of 
the coup, Bryennios remained stuck within the western provinces, unable to impose himself 
until Botaneiates had already achieved his goal.  
The third key mistake were the actions of John’s forces outside the walls of 
Constantinople. Bryennios dispatched John to camp outside the walls of Constantinople with 
the goal of winning public support from within the city and, consequently, a possible liberation 
operation. Regardless of the source discrepancies on the event, John failed in his goal and 
instead damaged attitudes towards the Bryennios rebellion. Focussing on Attaleiates’ account, 
the public did not embrace John upon his arrival, and by his association, Bryennios. The 
public’s reaction to John’s forces was likely to be a result from two things: first, John’s forces 
were large and had a strong multi-ethnic structure which included a number of mercenaries. 
The Constantinopolitan populace were tired and wary of seeing ‘foreign’ forces patrolling the 
city, and seeing an army compiled with a strong foreign element, surely made them cautious.89 
Second, the same army, then standing in front of Constantinople, was the same force that had 
been troublesome in the western provinces.90 Thus, the public’s perception of distrust towards 
John was confirmed when the racing parties organised their men to fight alongside the garrison 
force in the city’s defence. When John had failed and consequently burned the suburbs in rage, 
it led to a complete breakdown of trust between Bryennios’ cause and those he was trying to 
win over. This action left Bryennios isolated and even if he eventually did become emperor, he 
would have had to deal with the internal issues that arose from these events.91  
Nikephoros’ narrative offers a different perspective. The arrival of John’s troops 
outside the walls was positive, however, and it was only after his soldiers burned the city’s 
neighbouring suburbs that the populace became angry. Nikephoros, by attributing the burning 
                                               
89 Attaleiates, History. XXXII. 267-8. 
90 Bryennios, Material for History. III. 10. Once again, Nikephoros tried to cover up Bryennios’ actions and demonstrates 
Bryennios’ concerns about sending a multi-ethnic force to Constantinople’s walls. This also reconfirms the literary 
transmission of the twelfth century. See ft. 78.  
91 A similar instance occurred during Alexios’ coup in AD 1081. Alexios’ forces had stormed Constantinople and began 
pillaging within the city. Alexios, and his family, to atone for his inability to control his men, and on behalf of his men’s 
actions, undertook a forty-day repentance. Komnena, Alexiad. III. V-VI.  






of the suburbs to John’s soldiers and not specifically John, redeemed John’s character, and by 
association, his brother Bryennios.92 Despite Nikephoros’ attempt to pass the blame, it 
demonstrated the flaws of John’s leadership. John did not have control his men and did not 
have the ability to limit the ill-feeling caused between the Bryennios coup and the 
Constantinopolitan populace.  
Both narratives seem to have plausible correlations, and suitable reactions for their 
respective circumstances. Although the justification of the events from both narratives are 
different, they still arrive at the same conclusion, albeit certain actions are undertaken in 
reverse. Despite the differences, it would be sensible to place the burning of the suburbs before 
the initial assault on the city. This would justify the populace’s consequent involvement against 
John’s troops given some had lost their land from the destruction. Regardless of whose fault it 
was, the absence of Bryennios reduced the event’s immediate importance, but the suburbs of 
the city were still burnt, and the populace angered. The actions enraged the capital’s populace 
and caused a hatred not only for John but through his association, Bryennios. Furthermore, 
John’s actions left Bryennios with limited avenues on how to proceed next. In comparison, 
Botaneiates let the public arm themselves to fight Michael VII and as a result did not incur the 
same repercussions.93 Public support was a key component towards a successful usurpation 
and after the events outside Constantinople, and Bryennios had lost it. At that moment, the 
public lost faith, and any desire for crowning a new emperor, other than Botaneiates. 
The fourth and final last blow to Bryennios’ usurpation was his dismissal of the imperial 
envoys sent to him by Botaneiates. Michael VII had stripped Bryennios of his former titles, 
which left him without rank or position at court and consequently, politically vulnerable.94 
Bryennios’ decision to refuse Botaneiates’ offer was illogical and arguably, foolish. The title 
of Caesar would have given Bryennios a place at court and allowed him to increase his 
followers and rebuild his support network, in addition to making peace with the 
Constantinopolitan populace. In the Alexiad, Anna suggests Bryennios would have excelled at 
such a position within the court, making his judgment even more shocking.95 Three years after 
                                               
92 Neville, Heroes and Romans, 125. The fact Bryennios was not present at Constantinople when John had besieged it released 
some of the bad attribution of the events towards Bryennios in literary form. However, on the ground, the populace knew who 
and why John was acting upon. 
93 Attaleiates, History. XXXII. 269-70; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 38.  In comparison, see Nikephoros’ account which paints 
the actions of the Constantinopolitan populace as rioters and barbaric in nature. Bryennios, Material for History. III. 18-19. 
Also see Krallis, Urbane Warriors for Botaneiates and the Constantinopolitan civilians as militia.  
94 Skylitzes, Continuatus. VI. 29.  
95 Komnena, Alexiad. I. IV. ‘So persuasive were his arguments and so great his ability to influence all men, even at first sight 
and the beginning of their acquaintance, that everyone, both soldiers and civilians, united in giving him precedence and 
judging him worthy of rule over the whole empire, East and West.’ 






Bryennios coup was defeated, Alexios Komnenos staged a hybrid palace/military coup against 
Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates and succeeded.96 Given the western support Bryennios 
held throughout his coup, and if he had taken Botaneiates’ offer and regained his position at 
court, Bryennios could have solidified his support groups and mobilised against Botaneiates in 
a second usurpation attempt. Nikephoros’ narrative might explain why Bryennios chose not to 
agree to Botaneiates’ terms. Bryennios retained a large proportion of his military force, because 
in Nikephoros’ narrative, he plays down the Pecheneg’s siege of Adrianople.97 Botaneiates, 
knowing that Bryennios was still a threat, did not want his forces to march on Constantinople. 
However, this was already happening because Bryennios left for the capital on the news of 
Michael’s deposition.98 The envoys arrived at Bryennios’ camp and made Botaneiates’ wishes 
known. Bryennios was to become Caesar and adopted by Botaneiates, becoming the legitimate 
heir to the throne.99 However, greedily, or not, Bryennios demanded Botaneiates also give his 
leading generals and statesmen titles.100 After the imperial envoys returned to Constantinople 
to relay the counteroffer, Botaneiates, feeling insecure, sent Alexios with a military force to 
defeat Bryennios.101 Thus, in Nikephoros’ narrative, Bryennios did not decline the offer, but 
wanted to continue negotiations. Nikephoros portrays Botaneiates acting in haste and insecurity 
by forcing a military confrontation between Bryennios and his imperial forces. Once again, 
Nikephoros is legitimising Bryennios by depicting him wanting the rebellion to end in a 
peaceful way, and thinking of not only himself, but also his men. Nikephoros is also 
legitimising Alexios in preparation for his future coup.102 Despite the different justifications in 
the various narratives, Bryennios did not take the offer, or did not have the opportunity to 
finalise the negotiations, resulting in conflict, and the consequent Battle of Kalavrye. The last 
chance for redemption was lost, and that was his final defeat.  
 
  
                                               
96 Ibid. II. I – III. II.  
97 Bryennios, Material for History. IV. 2-6.  
98 Ibid. IV. 2. 
99 On imperial adoption see, Macrides, Kinship by Arrangement. 
100 In Attaleiates’ and Skylitzes’ narratives, these terms were already part of the first envoys message. Attaleiates, History. 
XXXIV. 284-5.; Skylitzes, Continuatus. VII. 2.  
101 Bryennios, Material for History. IV. 4. In Attaleiates account, Botaneiates dispatched a number of embassies trying to stop 
war from occurring, however, Bryennios denied his offers several times. Only after the third refusal did Botaneiates dispatch 
Alexios - Attaleiates, History. XXXIV. 284-9.   
102 Attaleiates gives a glowing depiction of Alexios throughout his narrative, and towards the end of his History starts to 
emphasise Alexios as the new ‘saviour’ for the empire. On Botaneiates being the saviour during his usurpation attempt – 
Attaleiates, History. XXVII. 212. 







Bryennios was an individual who had the potential to become emperor of the Byzantine 
Empire. He had the correct characteristics, such as bravery, martial prowess, and notable 
lineage, as well as the resources at the start of his coup, to implement a successful usurpation. 
Nevertheless, throughout the usurpation campaign, Bryennios made a series of mistakes which 
cost him the opportunity to seize the throne. For this reason, it is evident that Attaleiates’ 
depiction of Bryennios holds some truth, thus it was not the character of Bryennios that failed 
him, but his poor decision making.  
Bryennios’ usurpation had positive factors; however, poor choices were taken 
throughout the insurrection. The decision to start a military rebellion meant that it carried a 
serious stigma against it from its inception, leaving his advantageous factors overshadowed. 
Perhaps the most prominent failure was Bryennios’ loss of public opinion, and after Bryennios 
had befallen to this injury, it left him limited chances and avenues for attaining the throne. The 
consequent backlash from those he was trying to liberate caused them instead to unite against 
his cause.  Lastly, Bryennios’ inability to adapt after the success of Botaneiates in March AD 
1078, ensured his demise and highlighted an unfortunate ending to what could have been an 
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